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ABSTRACT
The historical development of the role of directors in public listed companies contains
inherent tensions by reference to the fiduciary responsibility of directors and the
method in which directors are remunerated. The nature of incentive based
remuneration is such that it will compel directors, in certain circumstances, to weigh
their interests against those towards whom they owe a duty of care and a moral
responsibility to act with prudence and temperance.
The modem day corporate environment is complex and calls for directors with strong
ethical views. This assignment endeavours to identify some of the complexities that
contribute towards directors finding it difficult to stay on the ethical "straight and
narrow" and attempts to weigh the effect of those factors against the effect of
incentive remuneration, both as detractors from ethical behaviour. Both the
shareholder supremacy business model and the stakeholder approach are analysed to
identify those factors present in each that may add to the ethical complexity that
directors have to deal with. The advent of the stakeholder approach in particular, adds
an enormous amount of complexity.
The case studies deal with two South African financial services companies that have
both ceased trading as a consequence of unethical behaviour. The incentive
remuneration models of both companies have been found to have played a major
contributing role in the decision making processes in the companies, and have
contributed to the demise of these organisations.
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Lessons are taken from the case studies and applied against the backdrop of the
various principles of ethical behaviour namely rights, utility, justice and the ethics of
responsibility. The finding of this study is that there is a role for incentive
remuneration of directors, provided that the ethical pitfalls that this causes are
recognised and steps taken to address them. Some of these steps are identified.
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OPSOMMING
Die historiese ontwikkeling van die direkteursrol, en spesifiek van openbare
genoteerde maatskappye bevat inherente teenstrydighede met verwysmg na
direkteursvergoeding en die vertrouensverpligtinge wat op direkteure rus. Die aard
van direkteursvergoeding met 'n aansporingskomponent is so dat dit 'n direkteur van
tyd tot tyd in 'n posisie plaas waar hy tussen sy eie belange en die van die ander
belanghebbendes in 'n maatskappy, aan wie hy dit verskuldig is om met verdrag en
versigtig op te tree, moet kies.
Die hedendaagse maatskappyomgewing is kompleks van aard, en vereis direkteure
met sterk etiese oortuigings. Hierdie werkstuk poog om sommige van die komplekse
faktore wat afbreuk doen aan 'n direkteur se vermoe om ten alle tye streng eties op te
tree, te identifiseer en op te weeg teen die effek wat direkteursvergoeding speel -
beide as items wat afbreuk doen aan etiese optrede. Hier word ondersoek ingestel na
beide die sogenaamde "aandeelhouersmodel" asook die" belanghebbende" model
waarvolgens besigheid bedryf word. Die ontsluimering van die belanghebbende
model veroorsaak spesifiek 'n aansienlike hoeveelheid etiese kompleksiteit.
Die gevallestudies behandel twee Suid Afrikaanse fmansiele instellings wat hul
bedrywighede gestaak het as gevolg van onetiese optrede deur direkteure. Die
aansporingskomponent van die vergoedingsrnodelle in daardie maatskappye blyk 'n
groot bydraende faktor te wees in die onetiese besluitneming wat plaasgevind het, en
wat uiteindelik tot die ondergang van die ondernemings gelei het.
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Laastens, word die lesse wat geleer is uit die gevallestudies, toegepas in gewysigde
format, en getoets aan die hand van die verskillende beginsels wat etiese
besluitneming onderhou, naamlik die beginsels van regte, regverdigheid, utiliteit en
die beginsel van etiese verantwoordelikheid. Daar word tot die slotsom gekom dat
daar wel ruimte vir aansporingskemas vir direkteure is, maar dat dit slegs eties
regverdigbaar sal wees mits ag geslaan word op die lesse wat uit die gevallestudie
voortspruit, tesame met die impementering van sekere korrektiewe maatstawwe.
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1PART I: THE STAKEHOLDER APPROACH CONTEXTUALISED
Introduction
Across the globe, more compames are beginning to place increasing emphasis on
adopting sustainable business practices, by reference not only to the profitability of their
business, but also to the social and environmental impact that their businesses have in the
areas where they operate, be that localised or trans-national. In a recent survey conducted
by PricewaterhouseCoopers (The PricewaterhouseCoopers 2002 Global Sustainability
Survey Report, August 2002), seventy five percent of companies polled in the United
States claim to have adopted some sustainable business practises. In this context,
sustainable business practises refer to not only the generation of profit, but also the
impact that conducting business will have on the environment, as well as the social costs
of such a business - the so-called stakeholder approach. This implies to a greater or lesser
extent that the existence of stakeholders other than only the owners of a business must be
acknowledged and their rights recognised. In contrast with the stakeholder approach, the
other major approach to business is the shareholder wealth or supremacy view that looks
almost exclusively at what is the best for the owners of a business ..
The stakeholder approach is nothing new. It has been practised widely in developed
economies such as Japan and Germany, whilst the shareholder wealth approach,
regardless of the statistics quoted above, is more aligned with practises in the UK and the
USA. (Warner M , Encyclopedia of Business and Management, Routledge 1996, Volume
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1, p. 775) The reasons for the stakeholder welfare approach in Japan and Germany are
largely cultural. By way of example, the German constitution states: "Property imposes
duties. lts use should also serve the public weal." Warner states that such an approach
focuses ultimately on the long- term health of a company, whilst considering not only the
owners, but also any other stakeholders such as suppliers, employees, customers and
creditors. A consequence of this is that shareholder wealth could sometimes be lower on
the list of priorities of those companies, than for instance job creation or the development
of quality products. (Warner: p. 775)
In countries where companies adopt the shareholder wealth approach, the structures and
practises of the boards of directors of those companies are aligned with the objectives of
shareholder wealth creation. Those boards are powerful and oversee the running of the
companies in a manner that promotes the financial interest of the owners, almost to the
exclusion of other stakeholders. In countries such as Germany and Japan, the boards are
charged with overseeing the long-term health of the companies, as opposed to the
exclusive pursuit of shareholder wealth. These boards playa much less active role in the
day to day running of the companies and focus on three major functions namely, (1)
overseeing the selection and succession of managers and directors, (2) reviewing
financial performance and corporate strategy and (3) ensuring that officers and employees
of the companies meet legal and ethical standards. In Germany, most companies have a
two-tiered board, the vorstand or management board, and the aufsichstrat or supervisory
board. The supervisory board performs the functions listed above. (Warner p.776)
2
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3Fairly recent changes in the United Kingdom have brought about a shift in emphasis on
the shareholder wealth model, to one beginning to be aligned with the stakeholder
approach. This change was brought about by a report issued by Lord Cadbury, on
initiative from the accounting profession and the Financial Reporting Council in the
United Kingdom. (The Cadbury Report). The Cadbury report was followed by the
Greenbury report, the Hampel report and lastly, the Turnbull report. The thrust of all
these reports was to increase the level of corporate governance in specifically listed
public companies. The combined reports provide the framework for corporate governance
in the United Kingdom and include reference to issues such as remuneration, expanded
responsibilities of the Board of Directors and the imposition of adequate checks and
balances to ensure recognition of other stakeholders' interests. (Roger Buckland:
University of Aberdeen Papers in Accounting, Finance and Management: Working paper
10-10: UK Company Board Structures and Corporate Performance: A cohort study of
1990s IPOS in the UK. 2001, pp. 04-19)
In the wake of the Enron, Woldcom and other high profile corporate scandals, the United
States have legislated the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in an effort to forestall a potential
crisis in public investor confidence. This Act has not brought about a dramatic shift in
the style of corporate governance in the United States, but rather emphasises the principle
of shareholder supremacy, whilst creating a legal framework in which officers of a
company may be held liable to a greater extent than was possible prior to the
implementation of the Act. (PricewaterhouseCoopers: A Comparison of the King Report
2002 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, p.5)
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4South Africa had, what would appear at first glance, a corporate governance regime
modelled on the basis of shareholder supremacy, and has adopted, to a large extent, the
principles of English law in its Companies Act and precedents, which precedents have
evolved and are steeped in the context of the shareholder supremacy model. "For more
than a hundred years, South African company legislation has been trailing English
company legislation. Though still based on the general principles of English law, the
1973 (South African Companies) Act goes in many respects its own way. " ( J.T.
Pretorius, P.A. Delport, M. Havenga, M. Vermaas: Hahlo's South African Company Law
Through the Cases, Fifth Edition, Juta & Co, pp.2-3) An example of this is the rule in.
Foss versus Harbottle as it is commonly referred to in South African legal textbooks.
(H.S.Cilliers & M.L.Benade: Company Law, Fourth Edition, Butterworth, p.563) This
rule, as enunciated in the case of Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461;67 ER 189,
determines that a single shareholder may not assume a role whereby that shareholder
claims on behalf of the company, if the majority of shareholders have decided not to
claim. The majority of shareholders control the company for their benefit. " The rule
in Foss v Harbottle as I understand it, comes to no more than this. First, the proper
plaintiff in an action in respect of a wrong alleged to be done to a company or
association of persons is prima facie the company of the association of persons itself.
Secondly, where the alleged wrong is a transaction which might be made binding on the
company or association and on all its members by a simple majority of the members, no
individual member of the company is allowed to maintain an action in respect of that
matter for the simple reason that, if a mere majority of the members of the company or
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association is in favour of what has been done, then cadit quaestio." (Jenkins LJ,
Edwards v Halliwell [1950]2 All ER 1064 (CA) 1066.
In 1993, the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa commissioned retired judge Mervyn
King to report on corporate governance practises in South Africa and to make
recommendations. This resulted in the publication of the First King Report. Although
not legally binding on boards of companies, the recommendations made in the First King
Report were universally accepted as establishing new benchmarks by reference to the
regulation of the conduct of and disclosures by boards of directors.
(PricewaterhouseCoopers: A Comparison of King 2002 and Sarbanes-Oxley, p.9)
During 2002, the Second King Report (King II) was published, in an effort to expand the
scope of good governance beyond those recommendations included in the first report. It
did so, specifically by advocating an integrated approach to corporate governance in the
interest of a wide range of stakeholders - embracing the social, environmental and
economic aspects of a company's activities. King II further acknowledged that such an
approach could result in severe constraints on management who previously may have
operated according to the exclusive principles of shareholder supremacy, and places an
obligation on the board to ensure that a balance is struck between those constraints and
financial performance. This obligation placed on the board should be underpinned by a
strong culture of ethics in a company, permeating from the top down.
(PricewaterhouseCoopers Corporate Governance Series: Being a Director - Duties and
Responsibilities - King II, p.34) The recommendations contained in both King Reports
5
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6are not legislated, but carries the approval of most of the major listed firms in South
Africa. The GAAP (generally accepted accounting practice) as adopted by the South
African Institute of Chartered Accountants have not formally adopted any of the King
recommendations other than to the extent that such recommendations made by King have
also been included in listing requirements for companies on the JSE.
It could be said therefore that the imperative for long-term sustainable corporate
development has been recognised in South Africa through the two King Reports on the
one hand, and the extent in which some of those recommendations have been
incorporated in the JSE listing requirements. This groundswell has not yet received any
legislative backing. South Africa is currently a country shrouded in a corporate
governance cocoon of legislation supporting the principles of shareholder supremacy,
about to emerge through a process of corporate culture metamorphosis to at least a partial
adoption of stakeholder principles.
The question is not whether the stakeholder approach is better than the shareholder
wealth approach, although the shift towards the stakeholder approach seems to
underscore such an inference - it is rather a question of which of the two models supports
the sustainability of a company best in that company's particular context. This also serves
to illustrate the difficult circumstances in which directors are expected to make decisions.
In both instances, directors' remuneration may play an important role in the correct
approach being chosen. If the directors are rewarded for other criteria than those
demanded by an approach that would serve the company better, an ethical dilemma
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7exists. Short-term profit seeking is not a bad thing in itself. Many compames have
repetitive short-term profits as their objective and strategy, thus making their business
sustainable. Short-term profit seeking is a bad thing when it is done at the expense of
sustainable business practises and thus at the expense of all stakeholders. In the context of
this study, and as borne out by the cases dealt with, reference to short-term profit, refers
to the latter.
It is easy, in the context of a company opting to adopt a stakeholder approach, to imagine
the numerous potential conflicts and ethical tensions that exist for a board that tries to
weave its way through legal requirements which endorse and support the rights of
shareholders to a larger extent than it does other stakeholders, and a pure stakeholder
approach with emphasis on long-term sustainability. Add to this the requirement that
companies must be transparent in their reporting and decision- making - and the need for
a strong ethical approach in order to substantiate board decisions, becomes an imperative.
Transparency will not only highlight those instances where short- term profit was
sacrificed in favour of a longer- term sustainable approach, but also the instances where it
was not. In those instances, and where directors are remunerated based on the short-term
profits, valid questions about those directors' ability to adopt an objective stance, could
be asked. Unless there are other compelling reasons why such an approach was adopted,
an inference will be drawn that the directors' remuneration model has a bearing on their
ethical decision- making.
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The compames In the two case studies dealt with hereunder have both relentlessly
pursued short-term profit - not necessarily to reward their directors, although that was a
material consequence. Neither of the two companies actively trade today. Stakeholders
have suffered substantial losses and commissions of enquiry have questioned the ethical
ability of the directors. In each case a commission of enquiry has been established - both
commissions chaired by Judge John Myburgh. (Report of the Commission of enquiry into
the affairs of Regal Treasury Private Bank: Executive summary, p.27) The commission
investigating the affairs of Corpcapital is still sitting, and has not released a report yet.
This study shows that the manner in which directors are remunerated, has a bearing on
the sustainability of a company's business. It has a bearing because the remuneration
model may be at odds with the chosen strategy of either the stakeholder or shareholder
approach. It also has a bearing when directors have to choose between their own well-
being and that of the company. It does so by analysing the role of a director in the
context of the legal and contractual requirements on the one hand and the demands made
by the stakeholder approach on the other, the demands made by business analysts and the
demands made by personal interests as exemplified by remuneration structures on yet
other fronts. These demands are not always compatible, and are sometimes diametrically
opposed.
8
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PART II: RELATIONSIDPS THAT CAUSE ETHICAL TENSIONS
The history of the nature of a director's relationship with a company
A fundamental principle underpinning company law, and which gives rise to a company
being seen as a separate legal entity able to initiate actions ex meru motu, is the
distinction between ownership and control. A company functions independently from its
owners, and is placed under the control of the directors. Directors are appointed by the
shareholders to look after their interests, but they are not servants of the shareholders.
(Hahlo's Company Law through the Cases, p. 366) Directors operate as an autonomous
organ of the company. The roots of the development of the current day director's role
could probably be traced back to the industrial revolution towards the end of the is"
century. The increasing mechanisation of the manufacturing concerns led to an increase
in productivity and output. Changes in legislation regulating stock exchanges and
company formation, such as the repeal of the Bubble Act, made it easier for industrialists
to raise capital to invest in yet new ventures. (W.A. Thomas: The Provincial Stock
Exchanges, Frank Cass: London, 1973, p.3) Gradually the owners of these businesses
could no longer devote sufficient time and attention to each and every business, and the
role of the professional manager or director, as we know it, evolved. We find tension
between this role that the shareholders expect directors to play and the stakeholder
approach.
Directors have been referred to as agents, trustees, managing partners and managers. The
rights and duties of directors are similar to those of the persons described above in some
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respects, but not in all. The extent of directors' rights, duties and obligations can only be
ascertained by a scrutiny of the Companies act, the common law and the memoranda and
articles of association of the company. The memoranda and articles will regulate the
nature of a director's contract with a company. (Van Dorsten JL: Rights, powers and
duties of directors, Obiter publishers 1992, 2.14 p.18).
The contractual relationship
A director stands in a unique contractual service relationship with the company. The
shareholders of a company appoint the directors according to the prescripts of the
memorandum and articles of association of the company. In most instances the
appointment is further regulated by a service agreement that spells out the directors'
duties and responsibilities, and remuneration for the performance of those. If that contract
does not mandate the director to adopt a stakeholder approach, the director may be in
breach of her contractual duties if she places the interests of other stakeholders above that
of the shareholders. A more utilitarian approach would be to argue that the contract does
not have to make specific reference to the powers of directors to adopt a stakeholder
approach, as this is already implied in the mandate to look after shareholder welfare. If
the adoption of sustainable business practises benefits the shareholders in the long run,
then the directors would have fulfilled their duties.
A few practical problems exist with such an approach. Firstly, not all shareholders may
agree with such an interpretation, and that could harm the proper and timeous
implementation of strategies. It would stand to reason that if shareholders cannot agree,
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then there could equally well be disagreement amongst the directors, with similar
consequences. Secondly, in the event of a possible conflict between an implied and
express term of an agreement, the express term would prevail, especially in instances
where such an express term has been reduced to writing. (IF. Coacker & D.T. Zeffert:
Wille and Millin's Mercantile Law of South Africa, Eighteenth edition, Hortors
Stationery 1984. p.54) If the director's written service agreement provides for a
remuneration structure based on different criteria than those that could be crystalised
from the implied terms of the memorandum and articles of the company, the implied
terms will have to defer to that interpretation supported by the remuneration model.
Unless the memorandum and articles of association of a company are aligned with the
type of approach that the founders of the company would prefer it to take, or at least,
leave it to the discretion of the directors, the tension will remain a real one.
The legal nature
In terms of common law, a director has a duty of care, a duty of skill and a duty of
diligence towards the company, which duties stem from the fact that the director has a
fiduciary responsibility to the company. A director does not have a fiduciary duty
towards individual shareholders, but towards the body of shareholders represented by the
company. (Percival v Wright 1902(2) Ch 421 at 425-427. Shareholders ultimately control
the company, and may cause a director to be dismissed if the majority feels that way. A
distinction made in law, which could be untenable in applied ethics is that a director,
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when that director owns shares in the company, and acts as a shareholder and not as a
director, owes no fiduciary duty towards the company or towards any other shareholder.
This dichotomy is part of the subject of this paper. (J.L. van Dorsten: Rights, Powers and
Duties of Directors, Obiter Publishers, 1992, p.183) It is almost impossible to try and
imagine when a director who owns certain share options, acts as a director, and when as a
shareholder. The lack of a clear legal framework does sometimes make the assessment of
ethical decision making more difficult.
Statutory law has anticipated the conflict of interests that may arise from the above as
well as from the privileged position of obtaining prior information and directors' ability
to benefit themselves, and has placed a number of restrictions on directors dealings in the
Companies act. These include inter alia, restrictions on directors to conduct insider
trading (section 233 of the Companies Act), to obtain certain loans or other financial
assistance from the company (sections 226,295 and 296 of the Companies Act), as well
as duties to disclose certain benefits.(section 227 of the Companies Act) The JSE listings
requirements go much further in so far as it requires substantially more disclosure by
reference to disclosure on directors' remuneration, than the Companies act. The
Companies act further requires directors to disclose if they have an interest in any
business that the company undertakes. Neither the Companies act nor the common law
states specifically whether the director is obliged to disclose the extent of the profit that
she stands to make out of a transaction, but it recognises the potential for abuse.
12
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Whilst laudable, the problem with this type of legislation is that unless there is already a
culture of ethics in a company, the law poses just another obstacle to overcome in pursuit
of, for instance a personal short-term profit objective. Once overcome, and unless a
culture of ethics exists in an organisation, such director's dealings would simply
disappear from the ethical radar screen. Legislation specifies the minimum requirements
that must be adhered to, but does not ensure compliance with the spirit of the act. The
Companies Act only requires disclosure in the case where a potential conflict of interest
may arise. If an appropriate corporate ethical culture was properly in place, directors
would ensure that any similar transaction would be tested against the strategic objectives
of the organisation and entered into with full disclosure, regardless of whether the act
required such disclosure or not.
The stakeholder approach
There is a long ranging debate about whether the business of business is sustainable
development. In the context of this study, by sustainable development is meant the
adoption of a socially, environmentally and economic responsible position by a company,
looking after the interests of all its stakeholders, and not only driven by short-term profits
at the expense of other stakeholders, whilst disclosing the level of its commitment to its
stakeholders through the so-called "triple bottom line reporting". "Tripple bottom line
reporting is both a conscious attempt by enlightened companies to build trust and an
explicit response to society's demands for sustainable corporate behaviour." (Tim
Dickson: Lessons from the great debate. Paper read at the European Business Forum's
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conference on sustainable development 2002) Sustainable development and the
stakeholder approach are one and the same. Sustainable development implies a
stakeholder approach whilst the adoption of a stakeholder approach would result in more
sustainable business practises.
Proponents of the stakeholder approach are ad idem that human (and business') survival
is linked to a healthy environment. Natural resources cannot be depleted beyond a
specific point without losing the ability to recover, with a consequential reduction in the
standard of living. Opposing this view are those who take the position that we have the
capacity to replace services provided by nature with services provided by man. Those that
cannot be replaced are not worth replacing.
Companies have a responsibility to adopt a stakeholder approach. They have that
responsibility to ensure that the company endures into the future for the benefit of all the
stakeholders. Only if a company shows promise that it will endure, will it be able to
attract the best management, which will in tum, enhance the company's ability to sustain
itself.
The opposing view holds that whilst the objectives of a stakeholder approach may be
laudable, it will not work in practise. For it to work, the commitment of all players in
society is required. This commitment is impossible because of the ever increasing
demands made on business managers by the new global economy such as the requirement
to get to market quicker, and to be closer to the customer. Demands for greater short-term
14
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profits by sometimes, ignorant shareholders and institutional investors with different
agendas and a different group of beneficial owners to satisfy, also detract from the
potential success of a stakeholder approach. The stakeholder approach is criticised as
being the flavour of the moment, and companies adopting this approach are regarded as
hypocritical and using the favoured status of the stakeholder approach to obtain a
competitive advantage in the race for short-term profits. "This is a sound development in
that it reflects what business has always been about, namely facilitating the most
valuable exchange between capital, competence and clients within existing frameworks.
In practise, it has to be said, many companies merely put on a responsibility face, without
linking their efforts to a core strategy. " (Per Uno AIm and Mattias Iweborg: Companies
can't remake the world. European Business Forum conference on sustainable
development 2002)
The inherent tension that exists between these two opposing views will not be addressed
further here. The purpose is to highlight the backdrop against which a company director
has to make decisions with a high ethical content. The stakeholder approach requires this.
Trippie bottom line reporting is designed to engender trust with the stakeholders. With
such trust comes added responsibility to balance the needs of all stakeholders - which in
tum requires that every business decision must be weighed to determine its economic and
moral value. It is not sufficient to have the appropriate mechanisms in place such as a
corporate responsibility taskforce chaired by the chief executive and codes of conduct
covering human rights, security, social investment and "public engagement" issues in
15
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Brazil and India. Such a company was Enron. What is required is a culture of high ethical
decision making in an organisation. (Tim Dickson: Lessons from the Great Debate)
The PricewaterhouseCoopers survey found that although a substantial number of
companies claim to have introduced some elements of a sustainable development
approach - "72% of respondents do not incorporate the opportunities associated with
sustainability into their business strategies or project, investment and transaction
evaluation processes. Even among those companies that identified reputation as a key
factor in their decision to adopt sustainability, only a third are formally evaluating
sustainability risks and opportunities." There is a correlation between corporate strategy
and directors' remuneration. If strategies in support of a stakeholder approach are
lacking, then it follows that the remuneration model will not have a stakeholder-bias
either.
The above attempts to deal with the concept of stakeholders as a rather amorphous and
unidentified mass of interested parties whose interests should be borne in mind. I will
now deal with some of the particular stakeholders other than owners, in order to
demonstrate specific ethical expectations and therefore tensions by reference to the
demands that they make on the new economy company director.
16
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Employees
Do employees have the right to expect of directors to apply their minds to the business of
their business whilst considering the impact that those business decisions will have on
employees - and sometimes defer a profit driven decision in favour of one that costs the
company more, but retains jobs? I think that it does not matter, when dealing with
questions such as these, whether employees have rights. The distinction between say, a
right and a legitimate expectation, is a legal contrivance, designed especially to allow
certain culprits to escape liability and responsibility. When dealing with ethical questions,
such a distinction is not necessary.
From a Kantian perspective, it could be argued that there will be instances where such
behaviour could be expected of directors. A utilitarian perspective could be that profit
should be deferred if the consequences otherwise would mean the loss of jobs. This loss
of jobs may result in a strike, crippling the company and negating the benefit of the short-
term profit. Similar arguments could be raised in respect of a multitude of employee
related issues, some of which are already recognised through protective legislation, but
others still requiring a strong ethical approach each and every time that a decision has to
be made in a slightly different context that rules do not provide for or where rules are
being challenged. In the movie "Zorba the· Greek", Anthony Quinn playing Zorba asks
the young man: "Why do the young die - why does anybody die?" The young man
answers: "I don't know." Zorba: What is the use of your damn books? If they don't tell
you that, then what the hell do they tell you?" Young man: "They tell me about the agony
17
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of men who cannot answer questions like yours." Rules do not and will never be able to
cater for all instances. Directors have numerous unwritten obligations towards
employees. They should not abuse their power. They should not steer the company in
such a direction and in such a manner that employees' security of tenure is threatened.
They have a positive obligation to continuously attempt to increase the employees'
standard of living by paying market and performance related remuneration.
Institutional investors and analysts
Institutional investors are a type of shareholder that warrant separate discussion - not
because they have any different rights from other shareholders, (in certain instances their
rights may even be diminished by legislated limitations placed on their voting ability) but
because they constitute such a powerful influence on market perception and a company's
share price.
Markets are run by Adam Smith's "invisible hand". Nobody knows exactly how they
operate. What is certain is that perception plays a major part in determining the liquidity
and value of a company's shares. The number of shares available in the market also has
an effect on the supply and demand, and therefore on the price that an investor is
prepared to pay. Institutional investors and analysts, because of their buying power on the
one hand, and their perceived insight into the operations of a company being analysed,
occupy a powerful position to create and dispel perceptions about a company. If an
analyst has public reservations about a company's prospects or on any other mater
pertaining to the company, this is sufficient cause for other potential investors to decline
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to invest, or for existing shareholders to offer their shares for sale in the market, thus
creating an oversupply with a resultant decrease in the price. If an institutional investor
sells its shares, the same effect could result, unless the reasons for the sale have no
bearing on the company's performance, and this fact is well publicised.
The result is that directors of public companies with listed shares are all too well aware of
the power yielded by institutional investors and analysts, and may be tempted to ignore
other stakeholders in pursuit of profit to satisfy the expectations of this class of
shareholder-stakeholder. Institutional investors work according to set rules whereby they
buy shares, hold them for a specified period of time or until they have achieved a
specified yield or loss, and then sell. Unless a company's strategies in a stakeholder
approach is communicated clearly to such investors and analysts, a decision in favour of
another category of stakeholder rather than profit for shareholders, could result in a
catastrophe for the company.
Consumers
It could be argued that consumers have a vested interest in a company for the product or
service that the company provides. If a company manufactures a life saving drug, the
interests of the consumer should have a very high priority in relation to those of any other
stakeholders. Such was the case when pharmaceutical company Boehringer Ingelheim
offered the distribution of the antiretroviral drug Nevirapene free of royalties, and thus
substantially cheaper, to the South African Government to combat the effects of aids,
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through another company, Aspen Pharmacare. In addition, the drug was also made
available free to prevent mother-to-child transmission. (South African Medical
Journal,November 2002, Volume 92, no.l l , p.859) The company stood to sacrifice a
substantial amount in revenue had the government accepted the offer. It is common
knowledge that government and other sceptics were reluctant to accept the offer partly
because Boehringer Ingelheim and Aspen's motives were questioned and partly because
our government's official viewpoint was that it had not conclusively been proven that
HW causes Aids, as ridiculous as that might sound. The pharmaceutical companies'
motives were questioned because it was thought that their strategy was to establish a
preferred long- term position for themselves at the cost of short-term profit. It is ironic
that the South African government so actively endorses the stakeholder approach in
conservation issues, regional peacekeeping and political issues and economic issues by
reference to credible and justifiable black economic empowerment initiatives, that it
failed to appreciate the effect thereof, which is an example of how the stakeholder
approach could benefit those left at the short end of the stick temporarily, in the long run
This example serves to illustrate a different tension - one that recognises the potential for
good intentions to be misinterpreted by an uninformed or cynical audience.
Consumers who have purchased high value items such as motor vehicles likewise have an
interest that a company adopts a long-term view in order to service the vehicle over its
expected lifespan, and might expect the company to make certain sacrifices for the
delivery of that service. Persistent unwillingness by a company to react to the
expectations or demands by consumers could result in a consumer boycott of that
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company's goods. This could result in the company suffering severe losses, far greater
than the sacrifice they could have made in adhering to consumer requests. In one of the
case studies dealt with below, consumer action in the form of a mass withdrawal of
deposits from a bank, a so-called "run" on the bank, caused the ultimate failure of that
bank.
In summary of what was said above, and not intended to be exhaustive, directors are
faced with a number of valid ethical demands made by various stakeholders as well as
other demands that are the result of the contractual and legal relationship that a director
has with a company and its owners.
1. Based on the contractual relationship that a director has with a company, tension
exists if the terms of the contract are not compatible with a stakeholder approach,
and if the remuneration model does not adequately provide for performance issues
other than profits.
2. In terms of the legal nature of the relationship, tension exists because the law,
both statute and common law does not seem to adequately provide for the
situation where a director is also a shareholder. Directors acting as shareholders,
owe the company no fiduciary responsibility, yet it is humanly impossible not to
be influenced by privileged information, despite the best regulatory efforts to
attempt to counter the effects of those influences.
3. The stakeholder approach holds two connected but still severable inherent
tensions for directors to contend with:
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• The debate about the validity of the stakeholder approach versus the
shareholder supremacy approach is not settled, and does not yet enjoy
legislative support in South Africa. Even if a corporate strategy in favour of a
stakeholder approach has been adopted, there is still a lingering doubt about
its rightful place.
• Credibility remains an issue. Statistics seem to indicate that the stakeholder
approach is viewed as a handy pseudo-strategy to adopt in order to create an
illusion regarding the adoption of the popular trend and to remain in the
mainstream of business flow.
4. Very often there is no room for profit and employee satisfaction on the same
balance sheet, due to the demands that business makes on costs. This is an age-old
tension, and one that has given rise to the theories of Karl Marx. These tensions
remain as valid today as ever.
5. Markets behave unpredictably. The one sure thing is profit. Analysts seem to be
sceptical about the stakeholder approach and companies are not doing enough to
inform them of their strategies in this regard. Analysts' opinions are held in high
regard and they are therefore courted by directors - to keep the share price stable
more than to explain stakeholder strategies.
6. Institutional investors hold buying power that can make or break a company. They
are seldom influenced by other considerations than profit, as they serve another
set of stakeholders. Directors are but too aware of this scenario.
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7. Consumers are also powerful if they could harness their collective power. In
companies where reputation is paramount, directors are aware of the constant
threat of loss of consumer faith in their product.
The main tension between the opposing sides above is the tension between short- term
profit seeking on the one hand, and satisfying other stakeholders' interests, on the other.
The glue between the two is the role of the director. Directors determine which way a
company's strategy will take it. The pressures brought to bear above are presented in
simplistic fashion. The practical application is far more complex and interrelated and the
potential conflicts somehow far less clear. Despite their best intentions, directors are only
human, and will be influenced by many factors, not least of which will be their own
welfare. It stands to reason that directors' remuneration in the widest meaning of the
term, must have a substantial bearing on the motivation for a particular strategy - if not
consciously, then unconsciously. The profit motive overshadows everything else in
current corporate culture. Profits provide cash flow, profits cause increases in demand for
shares, and see share prices increase. Directors are remunerated principally by way of
salary, shares and bonuses, the value of all of which are determined by the profit that the
organisation makes.
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PART III: DIRECTORS REMUNERATION
It is not the objective of this study to provide a compilation of all the permutations and
nuances of the various elements that normally make up a director's remuneration
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package. To a large extent, remuneration that does not have an incentive component
attached to it would be irrelevant to this study, other than where it may be argued that that
part of the remuneration is so great that it completely overshadows the incentive based
part. The relationship between incentive based and non-incentive based remuneration will
therefore be investigated, but not non-incentive based remuneration per se.
One would expect non-incentive based or fixed remuneration to constitute that part of a
director's income that would enable that director to maintain a standard ofliving that is
commensurate with the status of, and esteem in which the position is held, having regard
to the size of the company, the magnitude of the job as well as a host of other typical
human resource and pay benchmarking issues. By earning that part of the remuneration,
the director should be expected to perform her duties in accordance with her service
agreement, and to a degree that could reasonably be expected of a person with her level
of expertise and experience. This does not appear to be the case in practise however.
There would seem to be a shift towards greater incentive based pay as this type of
remuneration allows the director to earn more. In a country such as South Africa where
there is a shortage of skilled executives, the situation is particularly precarious, as well
qualified directors could demand higher packages without compromising the fixed part of
their remuneration, whilst forcing an employer to accept fairly low levels of standard
performance in return - but in anticipation of greater profits stimulated by incentive
based remuneration packages. This phenomenon has been referred to as "The vicious
spiral of greed" in The Business Day Management Review for August 2003, p.4.
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Incentive based remuneration is that variable part of a director's remuneration that is
determined by the achievement or exceeding, by the company, of certain goals. These
goals could be described in terms of a large variety of measurable components, but in the
current profit driven corporate cultures, are normally expressed as the achievement of
specific profit objectives. The contract that a director has with a company is sui generis.
The nature of the relationship between a company and its directors is also unique and as
such one would find a large degree of variance between the terms of various directors'
remuneration agreements. These terms are normally negotiated prior to a director
accepting a position, according to guidelines laid down by the company's remuneration
committee. The role of the remuneration committee is twofold. Firstly, the committee
assists the board in determining the most appropriate remuneration strategies and
guidelines for its directors. According to the King II report, the remuneration committee
should be comprised of mainly or exclusively non-executive directors to avoid a possible
conflict of interest. Secondly, the role of the remuneration committee is to assess the
performance of the individual directors and to make recommendations to the board
regarding those directors' remuneration in accordance with the achievement of their
specific goals. The remuneration committee thus plays a vital role in determining the
proper level of pay, and performance expected in exchange therefore, and balances that
with the type and quantum of the reward for a director having exceeded those
expectations. None of the above comments about incentive or non-incentive based
remuneration could be used to deduce or induce that the one is better than the other. In
the context of a specific company, in a specific stage of the development of the company
and other macro trends over which the company may have no control, such as the global
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economic climate or the scarcity of skilled resources, either may be more appropriate.
Determining which, is the function of the remuneration committee. The existence of both
types of remuneration in the same context causes tension, as they seem to be capable of
conflicting with each other.
The King II report suggests that directors are rewarded primarily on an incentive based
package in order to more closely "align their interests with those of the shareowners". It
is anomalous that the report should contain such a proposal in the light of the same report
containing such strong references as to the necessity of adopting a sustainable business
model - yet when the need for an alignment of directors' interests with those of other
stakeholders is mentioned, the only stakeholders considered sufficiently meaningful are
the shareholders. The tension created by this oversight, and its adoption by most large
companies and the JSE may yet cost corporate South Africa dearly. A further problem
with this particular recommendation by King II is that it seems to assume that the
interests of all shareholders are alike. As discussed above, this is not necessarily so.
Institutional shareholders may have an entirely different objective than a joint venture
partner who has invested in a company in order to obtain greater benefit from an increase
in its own and its joint venture partner's share prices, or from a pensioner investing his
own retirement capital. Which category of shareholders' interests should the directors be
more closely aligned with?
Whilst the King II report does not stipulate exactly what the incentive based remuneration
should comprise of, the most common forms of incentive based remuneration are share
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incentive schemes and bonus schemes. There is an undoubted correlation between share
and bonus incentive schemes by reference to their rewards to the participants for good
financial performance, but they are essentially two different things on many other levels.
Theoretically, good financial performance by a company year on year, will cause an
increase in the demand for that company's shares and a subsequent increase in the share
price. So, if a company performs well in a particular financial year, the directors receive
cash bonuses and they, together with the shareholders enjoy a concomitant increase in the
value of their shares. Regardless of other considerations, profit is still regarded as the
main contributor to share value, and the market does not seem to recognise a difference
between sustainable profit or not. This sentiment is borne out by the comments made by
the chairperson of the Financial Services Board, Gill Marcus, in calling on companies to
rethink incentive schemes to directors in order to "reduce the need for executives to
report gigantic, yet unsustainable profits annually, enabling them to secure healthy
bonuses ... ". (FSB urges firms to rethink CE's bonus schemes." Business Day 22
September 2003. The other side of the coin is that the market demands rapid results from
directors, thereby creating opportunities for directors to justify short-term profits. ("Little
room for error for CEO's": Business Day, 3 November 2003, p.19)
Share incentive schemes, whether share options, share allocations in terms of a restraint
of trade agreement or otherwise, are generally regarded as longer term incentives - if
only from the perspective that a director has to wait longer before receiving their full
benefit, and would be operational for a term of three to five years or longer. Bonus
schemes are generally paid annually or half yearly, and are paid in cash. At first glance,
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share incentive schemes seem to be more supportive of a sustainable growth model as it
pays dividends over a longer term. The executive bonus schemes seem to be more
tolerant of a pursuit of short-term profits. Unfortunately this is a generalisation as matters
are much more complex than that. For as long as profit remains the main driving force
behind the valuation of company shares, there would seem to be a disregard for the nature
of that profit. This does indeed set the scene for the pursuit of short-term profit year after
year, with little consideration being given to the sustainability thereof. As there is
automatically a tension between incentive and non-incentive based remuneration, there is
also automatically a tension between bonus schemes based on profit, and share incentive
schemes. If a company were to pursue a stakeholder approach in the interest of
sustainable business practises, then it would appear that there is little room for both a
share incentive and a bonus scheme.
In summary, there appears to be tension between incentive and non-incentive based
remuneration because of specific market circumstances which allows directors to
manipulate the minimum performance criteria in favour of a higher short-term profit
oriented result. Secondly, tension exists between share incentive schemes and bonus
schemes because the market does not recognise the validity of other sustainability criteria
as performance indicators for directors yet. This causes directors to pursue short-term
profit because they get rewarded for the achievement of the same objective twice - once
by way of performance bonuses, and once more by way of an increase in the value of
their share options. Lastly, the widespread if somewhat informal adoption of the
recommendations of King II may also create tension as it forces directors through their
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remuneration structures, to side with shareholders rather than with any other category of
stakeholder. (PricewaterhouseCoopers: Corporate Governance in South Africa: A
Comparison of the King Report 2002 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) That
recommendation seems to fly in the face of the seeming adoption of the stakeholder
approach by the King committee. The recommendation further causes tension as it
ignores the fact that there may be different classes of shareholders, distinguished not by
the different rights that attach to their shares, but by the difference in investment
objectives that they may wish to realise.
CASE STUDIES
The objective of the development of the case studies is to enable the reader to arrive at a
conclusion based on the principles of inductive reasoning, as to whether the model of
directors' remuneration had an effect on the decision making processes in the
organisations. If, through a process of elimination, the other tensions referred to earlier as
those that contribute to the difficulty in the environment in which a director must take
decisions, could be eliminated or afforded lesser status, then it would mean that
remuneration will have played a role. This process of elimination can only be established
as a matter of fact. Even then, those facts would tend to be subjective from the
perspective of the source of the information. The conclusion can therefore only be the
result of inductive, and not deductive processes. As such, they will always be subject to
an element of doubt. The case studies will recognise this, but will at the same time
endeavour to show those instances where remuneration did affect ethical decisions - on a
preponderance of probability.
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The measurability of utility sometimes poses practical problems as it is difficult to
determine whether a particular thing has the same value for all people. It is also difficult
to place a value on some things such as a life. In many instances, the consequences of
utilitarian actions are difficult to predict, and may, in some cases, not materialise.
Sometimes, the dividing line between cost and benefit is vague. What may be a benefit
to a particular person may be seen as a cost to another part of society - the manufacturing
The analysis of the cases will further attempt to determine whether, and regardless of the
business model employed by the organisations, the effect of the decisions motivated by a
particular remuneration model was contrary to the effects that should have been achieved
in accordance with the chosen business model. In determining what the desired result of a
particular decision ought to have been for a particular business model, cognisance will be
had of the "rights" approach, the "justice" approach and from the perspective of virtue
ethics and utilitarianism.
Utilitarianism
The utilitarian principle says that an action that produces the greater utility is the right
action for a particular occasion. «M.G. Velasquez: Business Ethics - Concepts and Cases,
3rd Edition, Prentice Hall,p.61) By this is meant that an action is the right one if the net
benefit derived from that action is greater than the net benefit of any other action.
Utilitarian principles are applied in ethical cases when there is a need to measure,
objectively, the merits of a particular decision.
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and sale of weapons will be seen as a benefit to the manufacturer, but the sale will be
seen as evil by the victims of warfare.
Utilitarianism sometimes clashes with the principles of rights and justice. This happens
when actions taken for the greater good override individual rights and the consequences
may be perceived as unjust in respect of an individual. The counter argument to these
objections to utilitarianism is the so-called "rule-utilitarianism." This principle dictates
that one should ask what the correct moral rule is, and only thereafter determine whether
following that rule brings about the most utility. This is an almost circular argument and
serves to highlight the flaws of adopting an exclusive utility- based morality. Other
principles need to be applied at the same time to obtain a balanced view of an ethical
question.
Rights
A right is a legal or moral construct allowing a person or group an entitlement to
something. Through the exercising of a right one can prevent another from acting in a
specific manner, or one could compel another to act in a specific manner. This is known
as negative and positive rights respectively. Each right has a corresponding duty. If I have
a right to use a vehicle on a public road, because I have a valid drivers license and I have
paid my annual licensing fee, then I also have a concurrent obligation to only use the road
in such a manner as would not cause harm to other road users. Although groups can also
have rights, this is not the same as the concept of a group or majority as found in
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utilitarianism. Rights are applicable from the perspective of the individual. In this regard,
there is tension between the two, as utilitarianism sometimes infringes on an individual's
right and other times, the benefit of the greater group has to bow before an individual's
right. Given what was said above, it is doubtful whether the principles of utility can
provide an adequate basis for moral rights.
The ethical theory developed by Kant provides a firm foundation for the principles of
moral rights - his "categorical imperative". Moral rights as opposed to legal rights tend to
be more "universal" in their appeal. Based on this, Kant posits that we should only act in
a specific manner if we are comfortable that the rule according to which we act, could be
universally applicable. Secondly, Kant holds that people should be treated as ends in
themselves, and not as means to other ends.
Critics of Kant have argued that his theory is too "empty", that it lacks precision because
it is too difficult to determine whether an action would have been universally acceptable.
Kant's theory assists us in determining what our moral rights and obligations are, but
does not help us to determine the extent of them.
A libertarian notion of rights is that the only basic human right is the right to be free from
coercion from other humans. From this basic right follows all other rights, such as the
freedom to choose. This approach ignores the fact that every right has a corresponding
duty, which is a limiting factor on that right. Rights are therefore not absolute.
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Justice
A fundamental philosophical question is, "what is justice?" From an ethical perspective,
if one has to make a choice regarding a course of action to take, the question could be
asked if the consequences of the action will be just. John Rawls, in "Justice as Fairness"
The Philosophical Review, 67 (1958) pp.164-194 advocates that justice could be defined
as fairness. He uses the example of the "original position" where a group of people, not
knowing anything about their circumstances, personal or otherwise, have to set rules
according to which the society in which they will live, will operate. He uses this example
to illustrate that in such circumstances, people would endeavour to achieve the fairest
dispensation. From that perspective, justice is fairness. Other notions of justice include
justice as equality - where every person should be given exactly her proportionate share
of society's benefits and burdens, justice as freedom - implying that the most just
situation is one where everyone has freedom to exchange their benefits as they wish. This
notion is closely related to distributive justice. Other examples of justice are capitalist and
social justice - justice based on contributions and justice based on needs and abilities. For
the purpose of the case studies, I will model questions about justice, on Rawls' notion of
justice as fairness.
Virtue ethics
The essential difference between other ethics based principles and virtue ethics is that the
others all begin with the question: "What is my duty?", whilst the Aristotelean conception
of virtue ethics begins with the question: "What is it to lead a good human life?" This
approach allows one to investigate the moral questions not as a separate and distinct
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subject, divorced from the rest of our existence, but compels us to ask the question in the
context of the entirety of our lives. (B. Magee, The Great Philosophers, Aristotle:
Dialogue with Martha Nussbaum, Oxford University Press, 1987, p.51)
Some latter day philosophers are of the view that the concept of a good life is realisable if
one lives your life so that you cultivate the virtues in yourself and in others whilst other
philosophers hold the view that a good life means that our moral thoughts should
concentrate on the virtues. Moral duties and rights should play a subservient role by
comparison. (Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Edited by R. Audi, Cambridge
University Press, Second Edition, p.960)
The cardinal virtues are those virtues, the pursuit of which will cause human life to
flourish. The cardinal virtues are prudence, courage, temperance and justice. In pre-
modern times, the interpretation of virtue ethics was only concerned with whether the
moral agent was a good person, in the context of the demands made on that person by
society. There was never a question of whether conduct was good or bad.
The latter day moral theorists draw correlations from Aristotle's concept of virtue ethics
to the ethics of responsibility. In terms of the ethics of responsibility, our morality cannot
be rule based or in any other manner definitively grounded. Our morality springs from the
responsibility that we have by reference to others - the moral appeal of the other person
on me. This is not dissimilar to the concept of "Ubuntu found in Africa, which literally
means to be a person through other persons, or, "I am because we are". (L. Mbigi and J.
Maree: Ubuntu: The spirit of African transformation management, Knowledge
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Resources, Randburg, 1995, p.3) One of the prominent current thinkers about the
concept of virtue ethics is Alasdair Macintyre. He advocates a return to this tradition
because of his disillusionment with the moral muddle in which we find ourselves because
of the conflicting principles of ethical behaviour. He attempts to formulate a unitary core
concept of the virtues in order to obviate the tensions and conflicts between the various
principles. In After Virtue, he formulates his concept as comprising of three stages
namely the concept of a practice, the narrative order of a single human life and the
existence of a moral tradition. A practice is that activity which allows us to realise the
goods internal to the practise (virtues). A person should do this in order to obtain answers
to the question of what is good for me - the narrative order of the single human life, and
test this against the existence of a moral tradition, in order to counter the individualistic
aspects of the narrative order of the single human life. This is not dissimilar to what
commentators on e.g. globalisation had in mind as a guide to assist people to counter the
negative effects of globalisation. Bernstein, in his commentary on Macintyre, holds that
Macintyre's approach does not achieve what he has set out to do, as it attempts to merge
traditional Greek philosophy, without a conception of history, with modern philosophy.
He agrees that some form of return to virtue ethics has moral appeal, but that exactly
how, has not yet been determined. For now, Bernstein argues, our narrative quest should
be to find a solution between the conflicts in the truths embodied in the tradition of the
virtues and the principles of the enlightenment. (R. Bernstein: ''Nietsche or Aristotle?
Reflections on Alasdair Macintyre's "After Virtue" in his Philosophical Profiles, pp.115-
140)
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CASE I:REGAL TREASURY PRIVATE BANK
For the purpose of the case studies, analyses of ethical questions will be done from the
perspective of the ethics of responsibility, with regard to Macintyre's unitary core
concept of the virtues.
Case
Regal Treasury Private Bank (Regal Bank), of which the author was an executive director
. and chief operating officer during the latter part of the bank's history, was founded during
1998 as the main operating subsidiary of Regal Bank Holdings, a holding company listed
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Although there were many more companies in the
group, such as a stock broking firm, a fund management company and a number of
others, it was clear from the beginning that the bank was the main subsidiary, as the bank
had access to the capital required to fund the growth of the group, and had in fact
provided seed capital for all the other companies in the group. The manner in which the
seed capital was provided was by means of a loan, so that the bank would derive the
benefit from interest on such loans as well as an increase in the value of the shares of
those companies. The bank was formed under the charismatic leadership of Jeff
Levenstein, and raised approximately four hundred million rand from primarily the
Johannesburg Jewish community as its initial capital. At the time of the bank being
placed under curatorship, the bank also had deposits in excess of one billion rand and
other investments valued at approximately five hundred million rand on a "going
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concern" basis. A large proportion of the shareholders in the group were also clients of
the bank.
The bank had adopted a so-called "new economy" approach by reference to its business
model. What this implied was firstly that it had adopted some form of stakeholder
approach in the sense that it had identified those groups that it regarded as stakeholders,
and also what it thought the mutual obligations and expectations were in the relationship.
These stakeholders included primarily the shareholders, depositors, lenders, other group
client and employees. Although never formally documented, it was understood that the
stakeholders as listed, were to be treated in descending order of priority. This was
another component of the so-called new economy business model in that whilst the
interests of every different category of stakeholder were recognised, it was also
recognised that the non-adherence to some of those interests would have different effects
on the immediate sustainability of the business. The main business being that of a bank,
and banks operating on principles of investor trust, this generally acknowledged that the
reputation of the bank should be upheld in all circumstances, and at almost any cost.
Certain specific events occurred during the last six to nine months of the bank's lifetime,
which events were a culmination of consequences emanating from prior actions
undertaken by the bank as well as tighter regulatory controls and new appointments to the
board of directors. For purposes of this case study, these six to nine months will be
referred to as the latter period, whilst the time preceding the latter period, commencing
with the inception of the bank, will be referred to as the former period.
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THE FORMER PERIOD
During the former period, the board of directors of the bank where the same individuals
comprising the board of directors of its holding company. The full board comprised on
average, ten members, of which thirty percent were executive directors and the balance
non-executive directors. The influence that Levenstein as CEO and initially also
Chairman exerted over the board was such that all appointments to the board were vetted
by Levenstein, and any director daring to differ from Levenstein, was summarily
removed by him. This was the case with a former Chief Operating Officer, Z Lopes and
other directors B Lubner and D Springett as well as Levenstein's own brother Brian.
With the exception of an audit committee of sorts, there were no other functioning board
committees, and specifically no remuneration committee. Staff and board remuneration
was the exclusive domain of Levenstien.
The bank had what was referred to as a culture of sacrifice by reference to salaries and
incentive bonuses for staff members and executive directors. Salaries were low, and
substantially below market norms (Deloitte and Touché Human Capital Corporation
salary benchmarking exercise conducted February 2000). Although salaries were low,
every employee and executive director had a contractual entitlement to shares in the
bank's holding company. This entitlement emanated from two sources namely a share
allocation in restraint of trade, as well as a share option scheme. The idea behind this
structure was to establish a culture of medium to long-term wealth creation, with the
emphasis on shares and the share price, whilst minimising salary expenditure. Payment
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of performance bonuses were almost non-existent and exclusively at the discretion of
Levenstein. There were no bonus guidelines or benchmarks or any other performance
criteria stipulated in employee service contracts.
Non-executive directors were not paid any remuneration at all for the performance of
their duties, and none were allocated shares. A number of non-executive directors were
however, major shareholders in their own right, whilst yet others had been granted
preferential loans at low interest rates and with no security other than the shares
purchased, to purchase shares in the holding company. Any person, be it employee or
director to whom an offer of a preferential loan in order to purchase shares was made, and
who declined, was seen as disloyal and eventually removed by Levenstein.
From a remuneration perspective, the emphasis was clearly on wealth creation by
stimulating growth in the value of the shares as well as an above average dividend policy.
Executive directors were regarded as sufficiently valuable employees to justify
substantial share allocations to them, but were not paid market related salaries, and
received almost no performance bonuses. The role of non-executive directors was
minimal in the organisation, and reflected as such in their lack of remuneration.
During the capital raising exercise initiating the establishment of the group, as well as at
its subsequent shareholder and investment analyst functions, emphasis was placed on the
profitability of the group and the bank specifically, and the effect that profit had on the
share price. The Regal share price traded at a level of R7.00 to R8.00 per share and at a
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price earnings ratio in excess of 10. (Profile's Stock Exchange Handbook, Jan. - Jun.
2000, Profile Media, 2000, p.383) The price-earnings ratio is a ratio that indicates the
value that a prospective buyer of a share would place on that share when it is purchased,
in exchange for the dividend that that shareholder would receive on the share. The higher
the price-earnings ratio, the higher the value attached to the share. In the case of Regal,
the price-earnings ratio was substantially similar or slightly higher than the average for
the banking industry - no mean feat considering small banks were not awarded the same
status as larger banks. Due primarily to the unexpectedly high profitability of the bank as
a consequence of Leventeins' revolutionary business model, the bank was favourably
regarded by the investment community. The bank was a classic example of a company
that paid lip service to the stakeholder approach, but focused almost exclusively on
delivering profits for the sake of promoting the share price.
THE LATTER PERIOD
A number of things happened simultaneously during the last six to nine months of the
bank's existence, which combined, caused the bank to tumble from its pedestal. Firstly, a
number of directors became disenchanted and concerned with the manner in which
Levenstein exerted his power over the board. These directors either resigned or were
pushed out, and in most instances their leaving the bank was followed up by litigation,
with the bank being the protagonist. The purpose of the litigation was to "protect the
reputation of the bank", and in the process also avert the attention of the South African
Reserve Bank, who, through the office of the Registrar of Banks has the function of
regulating the banking industry in South Africa. Because the Registrar of Banks has to
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be notified of all resignations and new appointments to a board of a bank, the
uncommonly high turnover in board members attracted attention, and resulted in the
Registrar appointing the audit firm Deloitte and Touche, to conduct an investigation into
the affairs of the bank in terms of Section 7 of the Banks Act. The scope of the
investigation was to make enquiries about the high turnover in board members, corporate
governance and committee structures in the bank in general as well as making an
assessment of the possible abuse of his powers by Levenstein due to his strong position as
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. The findings of Deloitte and Touché in terms of
their investigation highlighted several major corporate governance breaches and this was
quite damaging to the relationship between the board and the office of the Registrar of
Banks.
Slightly preceding this investigation in time, was another investigation commissioned by
the Registrar of Banks, again in terms of Section 7 of the Bank's Act, conducted by
auditing firm KPMG. This investigation was commissioned as a result of dispute
between the board of the bank and its auditors Ernst & Young, regarding the recognition
of income on the bank's financial statement, which income was derived from
Levenstein's revolutionary business model, the so called "branding model". Ernst &
Young were of the opinion that the income so derived did not constitute income
according to the definition thereof in generally accepted accounting practice, and as a
consequence refused to sign their auditors report on the financial statements for the year
ended 28 February 2000. The Registrar of Banks commissioned KPMG to conduct an
investigation into the nature of the income derived from the bank's business model in an
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effort to resolve the dispute between the bank and its auditors, before the bank's
reputation was tarnished. The KPMG findings were that the income derived from the
business model could not be recognised as such. (KPMG Report on an investigation
conducted in terms of section 7 of the Banks act, on the recognition of income from
Regal Bank's "branding" model, May 2000) KPMG used such dubious terminology
and presented their report in such a fragmented way that this prompted Levenstein and a
few other board members to publish the bank's financial statements, including the
disputed income, without the auditor's consent.
The bank was the major income contributor in the group, as most other subsidiaries in the
group were in a start-up phase and were not profitable. The bank's income, in retrospect,
could be broadly categorised as interest income, branding income and income derived
from special structures. By interest income is meant that part of the income that the bank
earns on lending out its capital and deposits. By branding income is meant the income
derived from Leventein's revolutionary business model- that income that was in dispute.
By income derived from special structures is meant income generated through the
creation of special structures in order to create income from assets that would normally
be regarded as capital, and which ultimately contributed to the demise of the bank -
which will be further be dealt with hereunder.
Interest income
It a bank has one hundred rand of which it has lent fifty rand to various borrowers, the
interest earned on the one hundred rand emanates from two sources. Firstly, the bank
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would earn interest from its borrowers on fifty rand, at the average interest rate charged
by the bank. Secondly the bank would earn interest on the balance of its capital and
deposits, in this case fifty rand, which fifty rand the bank would have on deposit with
another bank. The interest earned on this fifty rand would therefore be equal to the
interest paid by the other bank. Using this simplistic approach, it is easy to calculate the
interest that the bank should earn. In the case of Regal, investigations showed that the
bank was earning substantially less in the form of interest than it should have using the
basic interest calculations. This lead to the uncovering of the special structures.
Branding income
In the normal course of events, a bank would lend part of its capital to a business, based
on normal banking practices. In the case of Regal, the bank would not only lend a
business some of its capital, bus also insist that the bank's name is attached to that of the
business, as an additional token of good will, lending credibility to the business's name
and the esteem in which its suppliers and customers would hold it. The term "branding
income" is derived from this co-branding exercise. As consideration for the co-branding,
the bank would insist on receiving a minority, but still substantial percentage of the
shareholding in the company. The bank would also calculate the value of the new
business prior to having attached the bank's name, and thereafter. The result of this
calculation was invariably that the value of the new business would be substantially
enhanced by the addition of the bank's trade name, resulting in an increase in the value of
the shares of that business. Regal Bank treated the increase in the value of the shares of
those businesses as income in its income statement. It was as a result of these practices
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that the bank was able to show substantial trading profits even in its first year of
operation. All it had to do was strike similar agreements with any number of smaller
companies wishing to borrow money, and it would have a virtually inexhaustible source
of super, albeit paper, profit.
Income derived from special structures
Because of the high demand for a strong and ever increasing share price as dictated by
the bank's culture and promises made to shareholders, the dispute in respect of the
recognition of the branding income caused substantial reputational damage as well as an
urgent need to maintain the perception of unprecedented profitability based on a
revolutionary business model. This gave rise to the creation of alternative structures
through which these "super profits" could be generated. In its simplest form, the bank
would establish complex structures such as special purpose vehicles into which it would
invest depositor's funds, which would otherwise be available to lenders. These funds
would then be used to purchase shares in the bank's holding company on the open
market, whilst the value of the investment would be determined by the increase or
decrease in the value of the underlying Regal Holdings' shares. If the share price went
up, the bank would be able to continue to show substantial profits. If the value went
down, the bank would show losses, hence increased pressure upon the share price to keep
rising. One of the ways to keep a share price going up regardless of poor market
perceptions would be to continue buying, or "mopping up" shares. Due to the negative
publicity surrounding the bank, there were may shares available in the market, most of
which were bought by the bank through these structures, resulting in the bank ultimately
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controlling in excess of forty seven percent of the issued shares of its holding company.
This was not only illegal, but had also used roughly half of the bank's capital and
deposits for investments that did not yield a prudent interest return.
As part of the solution to some of the shortcoming identified by the vanous
investigations, as proposed by the Registrar of Banks, the boards of the holding company
and the bank were to be reconstituted, proper functioning committee structures were to be
put in place and the concept of branding income was to be abandoned. The introduction
of committees and new board members resulted in the identification of the alternative
structures. Once the auditors were notified of the existence of these structures by the new
board members, they withdrew their consent for the publication of the 2001 financial
statements. The negative publicity surrounding the withdrawal of their consent resulted
in the loss oftrust in the bank by its depositors. Depositors demanded that the bank repay
their deposits, a so-called "run" on the deposits of the bank. Because the majority of
deposits were illiquid, primarily because of the investment in special structures, there was
hardly sufficient money to repay depositors, resulting in the Minister of Finance placing
the bank under curatorship.
The position is undoubtedly complex, and it would be unwise to try and reduce the
reasons for the demise of the bank to one or two only. In the discussion of this case study
an attempt will be made to eliminate, as far as possible, those tensions that may be said
not have had a major impact, and to investigate the interplay between the remaining non-
remuneration tensions and remuneration related tensions in order to achieve a greater
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insight into the role that directors remuneration had played. The central question to be
answered is therefore not whether the particular model of directors remuneration adopted
to the bank had been the sole cause of the demise of the bank, but whether the directors
remuneration did playa contributing role, and whether anything might have been done as
far as the directors remuneration is concerned in order to have changed the outcome of
this saga.
Discussion
A unique tension that existed in Regal was the uncertainty that directors had regarding
their tenure. This uncertainty did not stem from any flaw in their contractual relationships
with the company, but rather from the enormous influence that Levenstein exerted over
the Board and the company. Regardless of contractual rights and obligations, and
especially during the former period, directors had to do Levenstein's bidding or face
dismissal. Decision making was limited, with individual directors rather acting on
instructions than exercising their own discretion.
Directors' individual service contracts with the company did not provide for a
measurement of their performance against any set criteria. The determination of incentive
rewards such as bonuses was left entirely to Levenstein. This changed during the latter
period, but was a case of too little too late. With the exception of shares allocated to
directors in terms of their original contracts, additional share options were issued from
time to time. The allocation of these options was again left entirely to Levenstein's
discretion and no formal guidelines were set. The directors were not alone in this
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position. Al staff members were treated in the same manner, contributing to the general
aura of uncertainty.
In addition to contractual share entitlements, many directors were shareholders in their
private capacities, having borrowed money from Regal Bank to purchase them. The loan
arrangements for the purchase of the shares were so favourable, that any director offered
such an opportunity and declined, was branded disloyal. Directors, it would appear, did
not differentiate between their capacities as shareholders and directors. Because of the
weighting attached to their shareholding relative to their other remuneration and the
uncertainty linked to that other shareholding, shares and the share price became
everything in the organisation. If the shares were the only thing that was relatively
certain, and the only variable was the value of the share price, then, from that perspective,
it stands to reason that every endeavour had to be made to ensure a constant increase in
the share price. The fiduciary duties owed to the company were placed a firm second
behind personal interest. None of the transactions involving loans to directors to purchase
shares were ever disclosed and complicated structures with front companies and special
purpose vehicles were used. This tum of events did not happen by chance. It was the
design of Levenstein to ensure that he retained his position of power whilst keeping the
employees "hungry". The company did not pay its employees well - the so-called culture
of sacrifice, specifically so that the share price became of paramount importance.
Although the company purported to have adopted a type of stakeholder approach, the
internal structures were not supportive of that approach. This caused tension from the
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perspective that directors had to decide beforehand, not how to decide about a particular
issue, but how they were going to justify the decision in the context of a stakeholder
approach. This led to many explanations in language designed to obfuscate, as most
decisions were taken with the share price in mind.
Employee satisfaction did not rank high in the scheme of things at Regal. Employees
were paid less than market related salaries. The justification for this was the value that
they had locked in with their shares. All employees had shares, even the labourers.
Levenstein and a number of other board members were committed to the Jewish faith. As
such, the company spared no expense to promote religious activities on its premises. Only
"kosher" foods would be allowed at functions and no person was allowed to work on
Saturdays. Whilst laudable, a large percentage of employees were nor of the same
religious persuasion. Their interests were not considered and were, in some instances,
overridden.
Because of the importance of the share price in the context of the entire business, much
time was devoted to ensuring that all the right messages were sent to analysts. Regular
meetings were held with selected analysts, the services of professional public relations
firms were employed and when Levenstein's reputation began to be questioned, other
members of the Board were tasked with the job of communicating with the analysts. The
lovelhate relationship that Regal had with analysts caused an enormous amount of tension
in the organisation. Whilst Levenstein realised that he needed them, he also resented them
for the power that they wielded. Decisions that Levenstein felt were the exclusive domain
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of management had to be justified to them. Not only was this regarded as an intrusion
into management's discretion, but facts often had to be coloured in order to obfuscate the
real issues.
Regal did have an institutional investor in the form of Pekane Investments, a black
empowerment investment company that held in excess of 15% of the issued share capital.
(Regal Treasury Bank Holdings Annual Financial Statements for the year ended 28
February 2000, p.40) When Regal's share price started to decline, Pekane, who had
financed their acquisition of the shares wanted to dispose of the shares because the value
had gone below their internal benchmarks. This posed a major problem for Regal from a
number of perspectives. Firstly, the release of such a large number of shares in the market
would have increased supply with a potential negative effect on the already declining
share price. Secondly, the sale of such a large percentage of shares by a single investor
would have harmed the reputation of the organisation and caused the share price further
damage. The concerns were all related to the share price because the entire organisations
future was gambled on the share price increasing in value. No other factors were
considered. This led to the bank funding the repurchase of the Pekane shares from
depositors' funds and the consequent "hiding" of the highly irregular transaction from all,
including the auditors. When later uncovered by the then Chief Operating Officer, this
transaction directly led to the downfall of the bank.
Consumers of the bank can be divided into two broad categories - those that lent the bank
money, the depositors and those that borrowed from the bank. The bank was not overly
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concerned about the borrowers, as the relationship with those clients was contractually
regulated. The bank was concerned with its reputation for the purpose of attracting
deposits, without which no bank can conduct its business. Therefore, messages that were
formulated to communicate with institutional investors and analysts were also crafted
with depositors in mind - the deception had to extend to them as well. When the
reputation of the bank was finally damaged beyond repair, the depositors demanded their
deposits back, causing the bank to be placed under curatorship.
Regal was not managed according to the stakeholder principles. It paid lip service to that
principle, but had to, as part of the process, entertain some of the tensions that would
normally be associated with having adopted a stakeholder approach. This does not detract
from the fact that the company was exclusively focussed on the creation of shareholder
wealth, but renders the context in which directors' decisions are analysed more complex.
Given the central theme of share price manipulation, the tensions identified are all
causally related. The obsession with the share price created the tension in the relationship
with analysts, it created the scheme whereby the institutional investor's shares were
bought back, it created the environment within which both directors and staff had to
operate and it created the environment where actions of directors who ignored their
fiduciary duties in favour of their interests as shareholders were condoned.
The central moral question is one that encapsulates all these tensions. The question is
whether moral justification for directors participating in share schemes can be found in
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the context of the case study. If not, I will endeavour to find other contexts in which such
participation may well be morally justifiable.
From a rights perspective, directors contract with a company. In terms of that contract,
they acquire legal rights, which may include a right to shares. In the case of Regal it did.
At first glance it may appear that the Regal directors were entitled to their shares.
Legally, if not an express term, them an implied term of any service agreement is that the
director is expected to discharge his duties to the best of his abilities and within the
parameters of the requirements in law. Where participation in a share scheme causes the
director to ignore his legal duties, in this case his fiduciary duties, then the contract
becomes voidable. It would appear therefore that Regal's directors did not have an
unconditional right to the shares. They failed to prove that they have discharged their
duties adequately. Given the fact that a director's contract with a company is sui generis,
and that directors are regarded as knowledgeable persons, entrusted with the stewardship
of other peoples assets, it is doubtful whether a moral right to participate in the share
schemes could be construed over and above the contractual right.
From a utilitarian perspective, the directors could argue, as is argued in King II, that
aligning their interests with those of the shareholders will cause them to better consider
the interests of shareholders and thereby create a higher net benefit for the greater number
of people. As mentioned above, this argument fails to convince. Firstly, such a narrow
focus on the interests of shareholders excludes the interests of other stakeholders - even
in the case of Regal where the stakeholder approach was only adopted as a matter of
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convenience. Consistency demands that stakeholders are considered, even when they are
used as a matter of convenience only. Secondly, the argument fails given the
insurmountable conflict that exists between the rights and duties of directors qua
directors and directors qua shareholders. Because of the legal and moral requirement that
a director acts with the utmost good faith in respect of his fiduciary duties and no such
requirement (except a moral one) exists in respect of shareholder - aligning directors'
interests with those of shareholders for the purposes of utility remains a moral dilemma.
Negotiating from the original position, as demanded by Rawls' Justice as Fairness, it is
highly unlikely that shareholders will entrust the job of looking after their interests to
someone who may compete with them from a privileged position. It is more likely that
they will negotiate that the appointed caretaker must be disinterested, other that from a
professional perspective, or that if the caretaker has an interest, that that interest must be
properly disclosed and carefully monitored. This second alternative has an aura of
compromise about it which, I doubt will have been reached without any prior knowledge
as required by Rawls' model. It would appear therefore that shareholding by directors
will be difficult to justify from the perspective of justice.
The principles underlying the ethics of responsibility dictate that the moral demands
made by shareholders on directors be investigated. These moral demands have mostly
crystalised as legal and contractual requirements with passage of time. New demands
may however appear with changes in technology, the global business environment or
culture. In the context of Regal, I suggest that the demands made on directors by
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The virtues at stake here appear to be that of temperance and prudence. Shareholders
expect of directors to be temperate in their approach and not to place their ~nterests ahead
of those of the shareholders. They may expect of the directors to sacrifice short term
gains in the value of the share price for the sake of creating a sustainable business based
on the principles of honesty and integrity, as embodied by the Regal crest and slogan:
"Honor et Integritas". Shareholders may expect directors to act prudently, and not enter
into unlawful and dishonest arrangements regarding the repurchase of shares, whether
through barely legal structures or not.
shareholders are adequately covered in law, by reference to the fiduciary duties of
directors. In addition, and given the unique and sometimes glaring abuses of authority by
Levenstein, if not legally, then shareholders could at least have demanded morally, that
Levenstein's fellow directors take actions to limit his abuse of power. This would have
necessitated steps by the directors that may entail investigations and actions that beyond
the minimum required by law. Such actions would, ideally, be driven by an
accommodating corporate culture.
The practise referred to by Macintyre is the act(s) of so conducting the affairs of the
company that the internal goods that are realised is the sense of achievement and the
betterment of the lives of the shareholders. The narrative quest is the pursuit of the
corporate ideals within a fiduciary culture. The moral tradition is best exemplified by the
legal responsibility placed on directors - the duty of care. The actions of the directors
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show neither temperance nor prudence. Their actions indicate unbridled personal greed at
the expense of those whose interests they were supposed to protect.
Conclusion
The actions of the directors have no moral foundation. From the case study and the
unique context, it would appear as if participation in share incentive schemes as part of
directors' incentive remuneration had no place in Regal. This does not mean that the
same would apply universally for all companies. Various factors make Regal unique.
Firstly, the fact that directors were paid very little played a major part in elevating the
importance of the share price. So did the fact that directors feIt that they could not control
their environment, and so did the fact that the directors had no security of tenure. The
only relative security to be found in especially the former period vested in the share
participation, to the extent that those shares vested in the directors. Regardless of their
denials, the majority of the directors were aware of what was going on. Whether they
condoned it or were simply not strong enough to attempt to bring about change serves to
illustrate the lesson - that the lure of incentive remuneration could have a material impact
on a director's ability to make ethical decisions.
CASE II: CORPCAPITAL
Case
Corpcapital, founded during 1996, is a diverse, speciality finance company listed on the
JSE under the category "Speciality Finance". The initial business plan revolved around a
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strategy to buy compames In fragmented industries in order to consolidate those
industries. One example, quoted by Mr. Nic Frangos, a founder member and former
director of Corpcapital, during an interview with the author conducted on 290ctober
2003, of such a company formed out of a number of smaller ones, was Corpbuild - a
company in the building industry. Corp capital furthermore had banking and long term
assurance licenses, and had extensive interests in Information Technology companies,
one being a company styled Cytech.
During the early 2000's, South Africa went through a period that is referred to as the
small banking crisis. This period saw small banks suffer severe liquidity problems due to
a number of corporate governance failures, bad debt provisions and general negative
publicity surrounding smaller banks. This crisis led to some banks, such as Regal and
Saambou Bank, being placed under curatorship; some were consolidated and drawn into a
larger corporate structure, such as Unifer and South Africa's sixth largest bank - BOE,
whilst yet others, including Corpcapital handed back their banking licenses in order to
free up capital for the rest of the companies in the group. In order to meet certain
minimum prudent capital adequacy requirements, banks are required to keep minimum
reserves in the form of cash. This cash cannot be utilised for other purposes. Handing
back its banking license freed up that cash component for Corpcapital. In normal
circumstances, a banking license could be lucrative. Corpcapital did not hand back the
license only to free up cash. They were also the victims of the small banks liquidity crisis
because of allegations made regarding corporate governance failures in the group. This
led to reduced investor and depositor confidence with a subsequent high liquidity
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demand. "David Shapiro, Barnard Jacobs Mellet director for private clients said "at
the end of the day, there was so much suspicion and so much negative news flowing out
of Corpcapital that investors took their eyes of the bottom line ... some investors would
have considered it best to cut their losses and avoid any nasty surprises
upstream.""(Business Day, Opinion and Analysis, 15 August 2003, p.13
According to Frangos, Corpcapital's shareholders had adopted a shareholder supremacy
business model. Their point of departure was that ownership is the closest to an unlimited
right, and that being so, enjoyed the strongest protection in law. Incorporating the
interests of other stakeholders, according to Frangos, amounted to a pure ethical decision,
not defensible in law. As such, other stakeholders had no role to play in the Corp capital
business model.
Frangos made certain allegations regarding a breakdown in corporate governance in
Corpcapital, resulting in the board of Corpcapital appointing an independent expert to
investigate his allegations. Frangos then, disagreeing with the findings of the independent
expert, commissioned his own investigation conducted on his behalf by a firm of
chartered accountants. The results of this investigation conflicted with the findings of the
independent investigator. "The report said: "In our opinion, there was a breakdown on
good corporate governance in material respects. The valuation, accounting and disclosure
of the Cytech investment were incorrect and did not reflect the true financial position of
results in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles." Cytech is a key
issue. The unlisted on-line gambling start-up based in the Virgin Isles was bought for
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R4,5 million in 1999 but then revalued by the company at R149 million by August 2000.
This valuation was carried over as profit and Cytech became the single largest contributor
to profit for the year - fundamental to the R23 million in bonuses paid to top Corpcapital
executives. In August 2001, Cytech was revalued again at R221 million, making a profit
contribution of R72 million for that year. Since then however, the value of Cytech has
been written down to its current R65 million.
Payne's investigation found "there is no evidence management tried to manipulate the
value ofCytech, or were unduly "aggressive" therein". But Collett said that largely due to
Cytech, net profit was technically overstated by as much as R200 million between 1999
and 2001.
Another issue of concern was the suggestion that CEO Jeff Liebesman (who has since
resigned) lied to Old Mutual analyst Jeanine van Zyl about executive remuneration. In a
press release in January this year, Corpcapital said the letter sent by Liebesman to Old
Mutual "fully and accurately answers the queries raised".
Liebesman told Van Zyl the methods used to calculate executive bonuses were
determined by the remuneration committee in consultation with P-E Corporate Services.
He said P-E used a "complicated formula" based on "information which we are not at
liberty to disclose". But P-E CE Martin Wescott said his company had played an
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"insignificant" role in determining bonus payments." (Business Day, Company News, 15
September 2003, p. 10)
Frangos was the chairman of Corpcapital's remuneration committee. He claims that
executive bonus schemes were profit motivated and did not include other criteria.
Frangos further claims that there was non-disclosure on a substantial scale by executives
to non-executives who served inter alia on the remuneration committee and that this non-
disclosure resulted in the payment of huge bonuses to executives.
The board of Corpcapital have made an announcement (Business Day 15 August 2003)
that the company will not continue to seek new business opportunities, but that it will
endeavour to sell of its assets in order to repay shareholders, whereafter the directors
would thereafter go their separate ways.
Discussion
At first glance it would appear as if very few of the non-remuneration related tensions
apply to the Corpcapital case. Given the clear bias in favour of the shareholder supremacy
model, and according to Frangos, there was no tension between stakeholder related issues
and decisions that needed to be made. The position was clear - decisions had to favour
the shareholders. Further, according to Frangos, the distinction between a director qua
director, and the director qua shareholder was not made. It was generally held in the
organisation that a director would be acting unethically if that director attempted to
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separate his shareholder related issues from his fiduciary duties. Frangos admitted that the
position was far from ideal and fraught with potential ethical pitfalls. According to him,
the only way to ensure that directors' personal issues do not interfere with their fiduciary
duties, is to ensure that the directors are people of the highest personal integrity -"Good
corporate governance starts with good personal governance".
Although not explicitly stated, it would appear as if employee satisfaction was not
measured in any other terms than financial. The general impression was that
Corpcapital's employees were well paid, but that similarly, the demands made on them
by the company were high by reference to profitability.
A tension identified earlier, and that definitely had a bearing on the demise of the
company's reputation was the relationship with analysts. The influence exerted by
analysts was clearly understood by the company, as well as the relevance of perceived
excessive directors remuneration. When the analyst asked questions about directors'
remuneration, the answer given led to the credibility of management being doubted.
There is no clear indication that institutional investor considerations played a role in the
decision-making processes followed in Corpcapital. If however, an inference can be
drawn from the issue raised above, where it is alleged that Liebesman lied to an analyst
regarding remuneration issues, it is a short step to take from there to arriving at a
conclusion that profit would have been sought at the expense of other considerations,
should institutional investors have demanded it.
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The case is reasonably clear. Corpcapital was not hindered by many of the other
considerations such as other stakeholders, employees or consumers. Its primary stated
purpose was to look after the interests of the shareholders by generating profit. It clearly
had medium to long-term strategies in place by reference to the objectives as stated by
Frangos - to consolidate industries. This is not something that can be achieved overnight.
Sustainability of the business model had to be paramount in the minds of the directors,
and lacking. any other interests to consider, sustainability through the creation of
sustainable profits. An elaborate structure was established in order to create the
sustainability, including obtaining a banking license to facilitate the group's acquisitions
and consolidations. No expense was spared to assist the group with the attainment of its
business objectives. What went wrong?
Decisions with far reaching effects were taken by the directors. The decisions in question
are the decision to attribute such a large amount of profit to Cytech, and the decision to
make misleading statements to the Old Mutual analyst regarding directors' remuneration.
These decisions are causally connected. Questions regarding the profitability of Cytech
directly led to questions regarding directors' remuneration. The inference was there for
all to see. The inference was that the Cytech profits were boosted or overstated because
the directors were rewarded handsomely on that basis. Reference therefore, to Cytech, is
meant to include not only the decision to "overstate" the company's valuation, but also to
the subsequent misdirection by reference to the questions asked about directors'
remuneration.
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It is not common cause that the Cytech profits were overstated. A committee under John
Myburgh had been appointed to establish inter alia the answer to that question. The
writing down of Cytech to a value of R65 million would seem to support some contention
that its value had been overstated initially. It has already been established that there
would appear not to be any other compelling reason for the directors to have taken the
course that they did regarding Cytech. With the exception of shareholder considerations,
(and to a lesser but interconnected extent, institutions) directors' remuneration would
appear to be the only other factor influencing that decision.
If we proceed on the basis, that indications point, on a preponderance of probability, to a
manipulation of the Cytech valuation, then we have to analyse the shareholders' position
against that of the directors'. Looking at the shareholders' position in the context of the
Cytech valuation, and measuring shareholders' interests against the ethical principles
should give us a good idea how defensible the decision by the directors is, from a moral
perspective.
From a rights perspective, it could be argued that the valuation was not only done to
enhance the shareholders' position, but that they would have demanded that type of
decision from the directors. Such an argument would be short sighted as the valuation of
Cytech clearly led to market scepticism and a consequent loss of confidence in the
organisation. The valuation appears to be a short-term measure to boost profits, but not in
the interests of the shareholders - certainly not against the backdrop of a sustainable
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profit and business model. It would appear that shareholders would not have a right,
either from a legal or moral perspective to expect such behaviour from the directors. The
directors' contracts do not appear to require that type of behaviour from them, and neither
does the common or any other law.
The perspective of justice as fairness demands that one should consider the Cytech
valuation in the context of an original position. It is extremely doubtful whether any
moral agent, negotiating from that position would have arrived at the conclusion that a re-
valuation of Cytech was necessary. Ignoring all other implications, and considering only
the interests of shareholders versus those of the directors, no moral agent would when
wearing a shareholders hat, condone such behaviour and no moral agent wearing a
directors hat would condone such behaviour as it ultimately led to the effective loss of the
company and consequent loss of positions for directors.
From a utilitarian perspective, the question is whether the actions of the directors, by the
valuation of Cytech, led to a result that brought about the greatest net benefit to the
greatest number of people. The answer to this question is no. The shareholders (even
taking them as the only other parties) far outnumbered the number of directors. Any
benefit therefore passing to directors could only pass the utility test with the greatest
difficulty. Ignoring that approach, an argument could be raised that the shareholders did
derive a benefit from the valuation, as the profit attributed to the group as a result thereof
caused a temporary increase in the value of the share price. Given the uncertainty in the
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market, only those shareholders who sold their shares would have had a benefit. The
remaining shareholders would have, and did lose out.
From a virtue ethics perspective, it would seem as if the virtues under consideration here
are temperance and prudence. This is so as the directors have a responsibility to ensure
that they act as the caretakers that they are, so that the shareholders' assets are not
recklessly diminished. Shareholders demand from directors that they act responsibly,
without placing their interests before those of the shareholders. As has been the case in
the discussion of the Regal case study, the practise is the act(s) of so conducting the
affairs of the company that the internal goods that are realised is the sense of achievement
and the betterment of the lives of the shareholders. The narrative quest is the pursuit of
the corporate ideals within a fiduciary culture. The moral tradition is best exemplified by
the legal responsibility placed on directors - the duty of care. The actions of the directors
show neither temperance nor prudence. Their actions indicate unbridled personal greed at
the expense of those whose interests they were supposed to protect.
Conclusions
The actions of the directors cannot be justified morally, from any of the principles of
ethical decision-making. There is an absence of any other contexts against which the
directors' actions could be measured. Very few of the tensions (barring remuneration)
that could otherwise have affected decision-making were present in the case of
Corpcapital, yet decisions to inflate the valuation of Cytech appear to have been made -
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and the questions pertaining to directors' remuneration as a consequence of that
valuation, in total, incentive bonuses in the amount of R23 million, appear to have been
evaded and answered less than truthfully.
The only inference that can be drawn, and that makes sense in the context of the facts, is
that the directors were motivated by greed. The opportunity to earn huge incentive
bonuses through the generation of short-term unsustainable profits overshadowed the
high ethical demands made on directors. This inference is further supported by the trail of
deception regarding the questions about remuneration. Frangos, as chairman of the
remuneration committee admitted that the directors' contracts did not motivate any other
behaviour. He further alluded to the fact that many salient details of the deals on which
the directors were remunerated were never divulged to the remuneration committee. It
appears that as if some checks and balances were in place to ensure adherence to the
"rules", but that those with the knowledge and the means, bent the rules to suit their own
ends. In the case of Corpcapital, the lure of incentive based remuneration without
adequate balances, proved too great a temptation, and had a disastrous effect on the
company.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Both companies used as case studies had various checks and balances in place to ensure
not only compliance with the minimum legal requirements, but also with the spirit of
corporate governance as espoused by the King reports and a large variety of other
regulatory and other bodies. Abuses still occurred. Incentive remuneration played a
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central part in the occurrence of the abuses. In the case of Regal, the offending part of the
incentive remuneration structure was the share schemes. In the case of Corpcapital, it was
the huge bonus potential.
It cannot be categorically stated that all incentive remuneration schemes for directors are
immoral. It can be stated that they are open for abuse. The case studies have served to
illustrate some of the circumstances that would indicate that the potential for abuse is
higher than elsewhere. These circumstances could be summarised as follows:
Neither company had adopted a substantial stakeholder approach, but both were
subject to some of the other tensions that make ethical decision taking difficult by
adding to the complexity of the context. This complexity was used to obfuscate
and detract unwanted attention, if even for a short while;
In both companies, stakeholder communication was less than absolutely honest
and transparent;
In both companies, information was not freely shared by the CEO or other
directors - minimum information was provided, which severely curtailed the
efficacy of for instance, the remuneration committee. In Regal, there was no such
committee, except in name;
Both organisations had a corporate culture that encouraged and condoned short-
term profit making at the expense of sustainable profits. Both companies had
compelling reasons why that should be so;
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Neither company had aligned its remuneration policy with any other measurable
performance indicators to determine the extent of incentive remuneration, and
especially not in respect of the sustainability of profits or any other strategy;
Both companies had CEO's with strong personalities, coupled with a willingness
to manipulate other people. This was especially so in the case of Regal. In the
case of Corpcapital, this contention is based on hearsay.
Both companies had directors who were not dishonest or in any way different
(except for the instances referred to above) from any other director. The
combination of circumstances allowed them to abuse their position, partly because
of the tensions present in the companies which added to the complexity of the
decision making process, and partly because they were incentivised to do so.
Not present at either company, because they did not embrace the stakeholder approach,
but still something that could serve as an indicator for the potential for abuse, would be
instances where the memoranda and articles of a company do not expressly provide for
such a strategy or culture.
Does this mean that directors ought not be incentivised? I do not believe that such a
situation will be tolerable, and certainly any proponent thereof could be accused of
lacking practical wisdom - one of the virtues. What would then, be the circumstances in
which, incentive remuneration for directors will be morally justifiable - at least so that it
can be said that it has a lesser role to play in clouding the directors' minds when it gets to
ethical decision making?
66
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From a rights perspective, and drawing on the libertarian notion of freedom from
coercion, the principle of contractual freedom is well established in law. Directors should
be able to negotiate any incentive remuneration, provided that it is aligned firstly with
them performing their duties according to the minimum legal requirements. This is
already the case. In addition, given the lessons learnt from the case studies, the minimum
requirements may be expanded to accommodate other moral or corporate cultural issues
not yet embodied in law. If a director does not like this, he should not accept the position.
The director's performance by reference to the legal and moral duties ought to be
monitored regularly, by a properly empowered remuneration committee. I believe that
this simple addition of regular monitoring and the expansion of a director's duties to
encompass other moral duties serve to counter-balance the imbalances highlighted by the
case studies. From a rights perspective, incentive remuneration for directors could be
made morally acceptable.
From a utilitarian perspective, the moral objections raised against share participation as
incentive (or other) remuneration remain insurmountable as it excludes other stakeholders
from the equation. Even if it is argued that all other stakeholders will also benefit because
the company is successful, there may still be instances where success could be better
measured than by shareholder wealth.
A utilitarian approach with regards to bonus schemes could be justified in the case of
companies adopting a stakeholder approach. The directors are not exclusively aligned
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with shareholders, and provided that the bonus calculations take into consideration all
other aspects that are of importance to all stakeholders, would work well. For companies
adopting a shareholder supremacy strategy, the same insurmountable issues as discussed
above remain. It is doubtful whether justification of incentive remuneration using
arguments of utility will have any meaningful practical application given the narrow band
of its operation.
From a justice perspective, I believe that incentive remuneration could be justified,
subject to the necessary checks and balances being put in place, such as the proper
measurement of directors' performance in the context of both a stakeholder and
shareholder approach as discussed above. Using Rawls' model of fairness, I believe that
the "compromise" that is currently applicable by reference to the original position not
involving prior experience by the participants would work equally well if it is agreed that
the participants all have the same level of prior knowledge and experience. This strikes
me as the more pragmatic approach.
The requirements of ethics of responsibility, by reference to the virtues of temperance
and prudence can be satisfied by the introduction of the necessary checks and balances in
measuring directors' performance as alluded to earlier as they apply to incentive bonuses.
The instances where, in the case studies, the directors have failed were because of a lack
of such proper measures.
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The possibility of personal interests overriding the demands of ethical decision- making
is real and happens every day in companies. A holistic approach to the problem,
including not only regulatory measures, but also strong emphasis on the ethical
justification for incentive schemes, which can only be done in the context of a total
alignment of the corporate culture with proper performance measures taking into account
all the relevant stakeholders will go some way towards alleviating the problem.
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